Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)
May 14, 2026
Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)
Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026
Barr argues that an ample-reserves regime lets the Fed steer short-term rates via administered rates (especially interest on reserves), reducing interventions and volatility, so shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet would likely make money markets more intervention-dependent and expand the Fed’s operational role rather than reduce it.
Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)
Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026
Barr contends that reserves are a foundational input to bank liquidity, payments throughput, and crisis resilience—insufficient reserves can slow outgoing payments, cause funding‑market stress and amplify depositor panic—so he favors preserving strong liquidity rules and larger reserve buffers (about $3T of the Fed’s $6.5T liabilities) after 2023 banking stress.
Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)
Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026
Barr warned that allowing discount-window access to count pledged non-HQLA assets toward liquidity requirements would substitute central-bank backstops for private self-insurance, downgrade required liquidity quality, likely not reduce reserve demand, and raise the chance of future exceptional Fed interventions—expanding the Fed’s crisis footprint and undermining claims that regulatory relief can shrink banks’ balance sheets without side effects.
Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)
Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026
Barr argues the Fed avoids operating near the minimum ample reserve level because a thin buffer raises money‑market rate volatility and forces routine Fed lending (as in the 2019 repo spike), so investors should expect a practical floor to reserves and that low reserves would trigger balance‑sheet expansion or active liquidity provision rather than tolerance of volatility.
Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)
Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026
Barr says the Fed should separate balance-sheet size from asset-duration policy—letting the Treasury set maturity structure and, in normal times, aligning with Treasury issuance while reserving long-duration/MBS holdings for exceptional lower-bound accommodation and treating duration distortions as temporary.