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Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet

Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)

May 14, 2026

5/14/2026

Ample-Reserves Regime Keeps Short-Term Rates Stable With Minimal Interventions And Shrinking The Balance Sheet Expands The Fed's Market Role

Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)

Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026

Barr argues that an ample-reserves regime lets the Fed steer short-term rates via administered rates (especially interest on reserves), reducing interventions and volatility, so shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet would likely make money markets more intervention-dependent and expand the Fed’s operational role rather than reduce it.


5/14/2026

Reserves Are Foundational To Bank Liquidity And Crisis Resilience, With Policy Favoring Higher Liquidity Buffers Over Balance Sheet Reduction

Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)

Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026

Barr contends that reserves are a foundational input to bank liquidity, payments throughput, and crisis resilience—insufficient reserves can slow outgoing payments, cause funding‑market stress and amplify depositor panic—so he favors preserving strong liquidity rules and larger reserve buffers (about $3T of the Fed’s $6.5T liabilities) after 2023 banking stress.


5/14/2026

Discount-Window Liquidity Relief Undermines Private Self-Insurance And Raises The Likelihood Of Future Fed Interventions

Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)

Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026

Barr warned that allowing discount-window access to count pledged non-HQLA assets toward liquidity requirements would substitute central-bank backstops for private self-insurance, downgrade required liquidity quality, likely not reduce reserve demand, and raise the chance of future exceptional Fed interventions—expanding the Fed’s crisis footprint and undermining claims that regulatory relief can shrink banks’ balance sheets without side effects.


5/14/2026

Reserve Supply Floor Limits Lean Operating System And Signals Active Fed Liquidity Provision

Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)

Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026

Barr argues the Fed avoids operating near the minimum ample reserve level because a thin buffer raises money‑market rate volatility and forces routine Fed lending (as in the 2019 repo spike), so investors should expect a practical floor to reserves and that low reserves would trigger balance‑sheet expansion or active liquidity provision rather than tolerance of volatility.


5/14/2026

Fed Should Align Its Liability Growth With Treasury Issuance And Separate Duration Policy In Normal Times

Barr, Efficient and Effective Central Banking: Beyond the Balance Sheet · Federal Reserve (Speeches & Testimony)

Business, Finance & Industries · May 14, 2026

Barr says the Fed should separate balance-sheet size from asset-duration policy—letting the Treasury set maturity structure and, in normal times, aligning with Treasury issuance while reserving long-duration/MBS holdings for exceptional lower-bound accommodation and treating duration distortions as temporary.